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Authoritarian and Democratic Diffusion in Post-Communist Regions* 
Abstract 
There is a rich body of theorizing on the diffusion of democracy across space and time. There 
is also an emerging scholarship on authoritarian diffusion. The dynamics of the interaction 
between external democratic and autocratic diffusion processes and their effects on national 
and sub-national political regime outcomes have received scant attention in the literature. Do 
democratic diffusion processes help counter external authoritarian influences? And, in 
contexts where external diffusion of democratic influences is weak, do we observe greater 
susceptibility to diffusion from regional autocracies that might in turn reinforce authoritarian 
practices and institutions in “recipient” states? To address these questions, we perform 
analysis of data from two original under-utilized datasets—a dataset on EU aid to Russia’s 
regions; and a dataset with statistics on trade among post-Soviet states. We find that EU aid 
has the effect of countering external authoritarian influences that work through Soviet-era 
inter-regional economic ties. 
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Introduction 
 
What are the transnational mechanisms of the development and reproduction of authoritarian 
regimes? There is a rich body of theorizing on the diffusion of democratic norms, institutions, 
and practices across space and time, arguably accounting for the pronounced patterns of 
clustering of regime types in Europe and Eurasia (Brinks & Coppedge, 2006; Kopstein & 
Reilly, 2000; Lankina & Getachew, 2006; O'Loughlin et al., 1998). By contrast, scholarship 
on the mechanisms of authoritarian diffusion is in its infancy. A small number of studies have 
recently called attention to external aspects of autocratic diffusion, which may shape or 
reinforce regional constellations of regime types (Ambrosio, 2010; Cameron & Orenstein, 
2012; Koesel & Bunce, 2013; Obydenkova & Libman, 2014; Plantan, 2014). The dynamics of 
the interaction between external democratic and autocratic diffusion processes and their 
effects on national and sub-national political regime outcomes have received scant attention in 
this emerging body of scholarship. Do democratic diffusion processes help limit and counter 
external authoritarian influences? And, in contexts where external diffusion of democratic 
influences is weak, do we observe greater susceptibility to diffusion from regional autocracies 
that might reinforce authoritarian practices and institutions in “recipient” states? To address 
these questions, we perform analysis of data from two original under-utilized datasets—a 
comprehensive dataset on EU aid to Russia’s regions; and a dataset with statistics on regional 
trade, socio-economic indices, and democracy variations.  
 We find that not only does EU aid enhance regional democracy, as had been 
previously demonstrated (Lankina & Getachew, 2006, 2008; Obydenkova, 2008, 2012), but 
also, and most importantly for this paper, it has the effect of countering external autocratic 
influences that work through Soviet-era inter-regional economic ties. We find that regions 
featuring extensive economic ties with neighboring post-soviet autocracies are more likely to 
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score lower on assessments of the quality of regional democracy. We also find however that 
EU aid serves to mitigate these autocratic influences. Regions that have been relatively 
insulated from EU attempts to shape regional politics are likely to score lower on democracy 
ratings as compared to those that in the 1990s and 2000s have been recipients of 
comparatively large volumes of EU aid.  
 In terms of the channels of the transmission of democratic and autocratic influences, 
we find that civil society is an important conduit for democratic influences: EU aid to non-
governmental organizations helps promote regional political pluralism and establish checks 
on regional regimes. Conversely, soviet-era trade and industrial ties between Russian regions 
and post-soviet neighboring autocracies appear to reproduce soviet-era political-economic 
networks and power structures, which may be corrosive to democracy. These patterns of 
autocratic diffusion-through-trade may in turn help reinforce and reproduce patterns of 
authoritarian clustering in the region. Importantly, the paper finds that EU aid significantly 
mitigates the negative regime effects of economic ties with autocracies. 
 Our paper is structured as follows. In the next section, we discuss the theoretical and 
empirical literature on democratic and authoritarian diffusion. Next, we describe our data and 
methods and present results of statistical analysis. The final section concludes with a 
discussion of the implications of our findings for understanding the contending processes of 
authoritarian and democratic diffusion in Europe and Eurasia. 
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Theorizing External Democratic and Authoritarian Diffusion 
The emergence of pronounced spatial variations in political regime types in post-Communist 
Europe has spurred rich theorizing on democratic diffusion processes (Beissinger, 2007; 
Brinks & Coppedge, 2006; Elkins & Simmons, 2005; Fordham & Asal, 2007; Gleditsch & 
Ward, 2006; Kopstein & Reilly, 2000; Lankina & Getachew, 2006; O'Loughlin, et al., 1998; 
Obydenkova & Libman, 2015a, 2015b). Democratic diffusion studies provided an important 
corrective to scholarship that sought to explain emerging variations in post-communist 
democratic trajectories with reference to variables largely divorced from the geographic-
spatial contexts in which particular states, regions, or localities were embedded.  
 The mammoth presence of the EU as the neighborhood’s most important normative 
power inevitably conditioned scholars to focus on democratic forms of diffusion (Bunce & 
Wolchik, 2011; Dimitrova & Pridham, 2004; Kopstein & Reilly, 2000; Lankina, Hudalla, & 
Wollmann, 2008; Levitsky & Way, 2010; Pridham, 1994; Schimmelfennig, 2002; 
Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier, 2005; Vachudova, 2005; Whitehead, 2001; Zielonka & 
Pravda, 2001). A mere glance at the political map of Europe suffices to note that space and 
geographic proximity did matter for extending carrots in the form of prospective EU 
membership. Scholars have noted that the policy of incentivizing the development of 
democratic institutions and practices (Kelley, 2006) has been manifested also in instruments 
like the European Neighborhood Policy designed to engage eastern neighbors—and the sub-
national regions within neighboring states (Gel'man & Lankina, 2008; Lankina, 2005;  
Lankina & Getachew, 2006, 2008; Obydenkova, 2008, 2012)—without actually “letting them 
in,” at least in the short term (Kelley, 2006; Korosteleva, Natorski, & Simão, 2013; Langbein 
& Börzel, 2013; Smith, 2005). These forms of planned and deliberate EU assistance have 
been variously conceptualized in terms of leverage, conditionality, and targeted democracy 
promotion.  
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 A number of studies have shown that geography not only matters for the choice to 
extend the above forms of EU engagement in its neighborhood, but also in terms of the 
intensity of the more spontaneous forms of diffusion, as would be the case with citizen-to-
citizen interactions, business exchanges, or cultural ties. These forms of diffusion happen 
“without any collaboration, imposition, or otherwise programmed effort on the part of any of 
the actors” (Elkins and Simmons 205: 6, cited in Ambrosio 2010); they have been 
conceptualized in terms of flows (Kopstein & Reilly, 2000), socialization (Kelley, 2006) or 
linkage (Levitsky & Way, 2006, 2010). 
 An emerging body of scholarship has problematized the scholarly preoccupation with 
democratic forms of diffusion in Europe—targeted or spontaneous—suggesting that similar 
insights could be applied to explain spatial patterns of clustering of Europe’s authoritarian 
regimes or states in the grey area between democracies and full-blown autocracies. As 
Thomas Ambrosio notes, “, . . . international pull toward democratization is only half-
understood because it does not account for a countervailing pull from authoritarian regimes” 
(Ambrosio, 2007). Emerging scholarship on authoritarian diffusion has focused on both the 
more “spontaneous” forms of autocratic influence, as would be the case with diffusion 
through trade (Libman & Obydenkova, 2014; Obydenkova & Libman, 2012, 2015a); and on 
the more targeted regime strategies to “resist” (Koesel & Bunce, 2013) what are presented as 
western attempts to foment regime change or regional instability under the guise of 
democracy promotion (Ademmer & Börzel, 2013; Allen & Gershman, 2006; Ambrosio, 2007, 
2010; Brunell, 2006; Carothers, 2006; Diamond, 2008; Finkel & Brudny, 2012a; Koesel & 
Bunce, 2013; Plantan, 2014; Silitski, 2009, 2010; Walker & Kelly, 2007; Way, 2010; Wilson 
& Popescu, 2009; Wilson, 2009).  
 The above literature on authoritarian diffusion is a welcome departure from earlier 
scholarship premised on teleological notions of a steady march of democracy from the West 
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to the East. Yet, this literature, eager as it is to problematize the notion of democratic 
diffusion, has likewise suffered from a one-sided preoccupation with spatial dynamics of the 
spread and consolidation of authoritarianism (but see Ambrosio, 2010; Wilson & Popescu, 
2009). Furthermore, the theoretical and empirical treatments of authoritarian diffusion in 
Europe and Eurasia have overwhelmingly focused on just two autocracies—Russia and 
China—as active agents of authoritarian diffusion or democratic resistance (Allison, 2013; 
Finkel & Brudny, 2012b; Koesel & Bunce, 2013; Plantan, 2014; Silitski, 2009; Wilson & 
Popescu, 2009; Wilson, 2009). Authoritarian diffusion is seen as a one-way process (but see 
Gel’man and Lankina 2008) whereby the more powerful autocrats like Russia or China 
undermine democracy or reinforce authoritarian practices through exercising economic or 
other forms of leverage in weaker neighborhood states or simply by having a “prestige” effect 
whereby lesser powers are likely to emulate their policies, institutions, and practices 
(Ambrosio, 2008; Cameron & Orenstein, 2012; Fordham & Asal, 2007; Wilson & Popescu, 
2009). Yet, a near-exclusive focus on Russia or China as regional authoritarian states shaping 
patterns of authoritarian diffusion obscures the importance of lesser autocracies. The latter 
may not have fashioned targeted strategies of authoritarian diffusion, but may be nonetheless 
reinforcing authoritarian trends in neighboring states and regions via more spontaneous forms 
of diffusion or through socialization in sub-regional institutional and political alliances 
(Allison, 2008; Collins, 2009; Darden, 2010). 
 Any analysis of external democratic and authoritarian diffusion processes would be of 
course also incomplete without factoring in the domestic influences on the spread of 
authoritarian tendencies, or, alternatively, democratic resilience within particular states. A 
large body of scholarship on Russia has precisely explored such within-nation processes by 
comparing political regime development in Russia’s sub-national regions (Gel'man & Ross, 
2010; Gelman, Ryzhenkov, Brie, Ovchinnikov, & Semenov, 2003; Hale, 2006; Lankina, 
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Libman, & Obydenkova, 2016; McFaul, Petrov, & Riabov, 2004; McMann, 2006; Stoner-
Weiss, 1997). For instance, in-depth research has been conducted into how the Kremlin under 
Putin’s rule undermined sub-national proto-democratic institutions and electoral competition 
(Golosov, 2011; Panov & Ross, 2013; Reddaway & Orttung, 2005a; Reuter & Remington, 
2009); and how it has tended to reward regional elites for delivering a pro-Kremlin vote rather 
than for good governance or economic performance (Reuter & Buckley, 2015; Reuter & 
Robertson, 2012; Rochlitz, 2014). Scholars have also analyzed how regional authorities tend 
to emulate the practices of neighboring regions in ways that may further erode democratic 
institutions (Gel'man & Lankina, 2008; Moraski & Reisinger, 2014). We concur that longer-
term structural variations and the more contingent factors like center-regional elite and party-
political dynamics have an important bearing on political regime variations in Russia’s 
regions. In our statistical analysis, we seek to capture the effect of key variables 
conventionally employed in research into domestic influences on regional democratic 
variations. Yet, we also demonstrate that additional—external—drivers of sub-national 
authoritarianism and democratic diffusion are at work.  
 We do so by empirically addressing a number of pertinent research questions. The first 
question is about the effect of interaction between authoritarian and democratic diffusion on 
regime outcomes in “recipient” states. The second question is whether authoritarian diffusion 
transcends major regional powers and may be also characteristic of lesser regional players like 
Central Asian states or Azerbaijan. The third question relates to the potential of EU 
democratic diffusion in Eastern Neighborhood states unlikely to become EU members in the 
foreseeable future to counteract authoritarian diffusion processes in Europe. Finally, the 
fourth question relates to the channels through which the respective actors might influence 
democratic variations in “recipient” states or regions. 
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 Our study begins to address these theoretically-important and policy-relevant 
questions. We utilize a comprehensive dataset of EU projects carried out in Russia’s regions 
assembled by Tomila Lankina (The Lankina EU Aid Dataset). The total number of projects in 
the dataset is over 1,000. To our knowledge, this remains the only source of systematic data 
on the sub-national component of EU aid to post-soviet states. The data cover the years 1990 
to 2003, and contain vast amount of detail on funding amounts, project aims and objectives, 
the key European partner involved in the project, the key implementing local partner on the 
ground, whether the Russian federal government had been involved in the project, and any 
other foreign and other local partners involved. The dataset allows to obtain a detailed picture 
of the EU’s strategic aims and objectives in states with limited membership prospects; what 
types of projects it actually ends up carrying out; what kinds of partners and regions it tends 
to reward; and the spatial dimension of this aid activity.  
The nature of the projects and their stated aims vary, ranging from projects to support 
the modernization of regional bureaucracies, to support for ethnic minority group song-and-
dance ensembles, to funding to environmental awareness NGOs, to sponsorship of cross-
border cooperation initiatives involving local mayors and councilors. Consistent with earlier 
scholarship on the domestic effects of cooperation with democratic nations and supra-national 
actors (Pevehouse & Russett, 2006; Pevehouse, 2002), we consider EU aid as a general proxy 
for the extent of socialization with EU counterparts that in turn promotes democratic values 
that the EU holds dear. Furthermore, in EU documents, even the more “technical” projects 
like those aimed at raising bureaucratic competence in the regions tend to be framed in terms 
of the wider strategic objectives of advancing market economies and “pluralistic democratic 
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societies.”1 Implicit in this approach are ideas akin to those developed by Karl Deutsch 
several decades ago, in the context of post-World War II reconstruction. Deutsch saw contact 
and interactions—including social interactions—among Europeans as conducive to the 
development of trust and a core set of shared values (Deutsch, 1954). Because our data allow 
us to distinguish among project beneficiaries (for instance, regional officials, NGOs), we are 
able to gauge the extent of socialization in EU values of these distinct sets of regional actors.2 
 The cut-off point for our EU aid data, 2004, coincided with an important policy shift 
in EU’s relations with eastern neighbors whereby Russia and EU renegotiated their 
relationship to pursue the so-called “four spaces.” The year 2004 also marks the beginning of 
Russia’s steady descent into authoritarianism and Vladimir Putin’s imposition of a centralist 
architecture on Russia’s federal polity (Lankina, 2009; Reddaway & Orttung, 2005b). The 
implications of these changes in Russia’s relations with the EU and in its federal architecture 
were greater centralization of domestic policy making and greater monitoring of activities of 
EU actors. By 2004 however, some regions will have experienced nearly fifteen years of 
exposure to EU projects—some to a considerable extent—and the trappings that come from 
such exposure in the form of support for institutional development, training, equipment, 
know-how, skills, interaction with European partners abroad, and frequent travels to European 
partner localities. Project activity thus likely captures both the targeted dimension of the 
                                                          
1 See for instance, an EU Press Release on the aims and objectives of the Technical 
Assistance to the Commonwealth of Independent States (TACIS) program: 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-92-54_en.htm (accessed 30 September 2015). 
2 For a detailed discussion of the aims and objectives of EU aid provision to Russia, see 
(Lankina, 2005; Lankina & Getachew, 2006) 
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diffusion of EU influences through aid and the more spontaneous aspects of democratic 
diffusion insofar as aid fosters the development of linkages among ordinary citizens. 
 No such comparable data exist for the targeted aspect of authoritarian diffusion in the 
Eurasian region. In any case, barring the relatively recent systematic attempts to project an 
authoritarian brand of soft power by regional autocracies like Russia, few other post-soviet 
states have, or would be financially in a position to, pursue sustained efforts to influence 
democracy in neighboring countries equivalent to those of the EU. Even the powerful 
autocracies like Russia and China are not concerned with aggressively propagating particular 
ideologies, but are more concerned with curbing democracy promotion that they see as a 
threat to their regime survival (Ambrosio, 2007). The channels of influence of these states on 
their neighbors are likely to be through a form of demonstration effect whereby actors that 
regularly interact with one another end up emulating the practices, modes of behavior and 
value orientations of their counterparts in business, administrative bureaucracies, or the 
political sphere (Ambrosio, 2010; Cameron & Orenstein, 2012). Recent studies have 
demonstrated the intensity of labor migration, trade links and economic interdependence 
among post-soviet states (Cameron & Orenstein, 2012; Lankina & Niemczyk, 2015). 
Cameron and Orenstein (2012) note that the Russian market is crucial for national economies 
of all but three post-Soviet states, namely the global oil- and gas-exporting states of 
Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan, as well as Georgia. For instance, 25-45 percent of exports of 
Belarus, Ukraine and Moldova; and 8-25 percent of exports from Armenia, Kyrgyzstan, 
Latvia and Lithuania are targeted at the Russian market.3 These trade dependencies have been 
explained with reference to soviet-era patterns of industrial location and supply, whereby 
                                                          
3 Trade structure as of 2013; in 2014-15, trade between Ukraine and Russia declined 
dramatically. 
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particular republics specialized on the production of industrial goods or commodities utilized 
by specific industries in other parts of the Soviet Union. The importance of such links has 
been poignantly demonstrated in the recent conflict between Russia and Ukraine following 
Ukraine’s expressed desire to join the Association Agreement with EU and subsequent 
abstention from signing the agreement in November 2013. Aside from Russia’s usual threats 
to raise prices for gas supplied to Ukraine, Russia also resorted to economic blackmail that 
affected, inter alia, trade in consumer goods like confectionary and other food products. At 
the same time, in what is also a legacy of Soviet-era industrial networks, Russia has until 
recently relied on Ukraine to supply important parts for its military-industrial complex.  
 In the next, statistical analysis, section of the paper, we employ the EU aid and post-
soviet trade data, to analyze the interaction between EU influences and those of post-soviet 
neighboring states, on Russia’s sub-national democratic variations.  
 Based on the above theoretical discussion, we articulate our hypotheses as follows: 
 
 
General effects: 
 
H1: Geographic proximity to autocracies will have a negative effect on democracy in Russia’s 
regions. 
H2: EU aid will have a positive effect on democracy in Russia’s regions 
H3: Trade with the countries of the former Soviet Union (FSU) will have a negative effect on 
democracy in Russia’s regions 
H4: EU aid will counteract the negative effect of FSU trade on regional democracy 
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Specific channels of EU influence on regional democracy: 
 
H5: EU aid will positively affect regional democracy through its influence on regional 
authorities 
H6: EU aid will positively affect regional democracy through its influence on municipal 
authorities 
H7: EU aid will positively affect regional democracy through its influence on civil society 
actors (NGOs) 
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Statistical analysis 
Data and measures 
For our dependent variable, regional democratic variations, we employ the index of regional 
democracy originally developed by Nikolay Petrov and Aleksey Titkov, who at the time the 
index was developed were scholars at the Moscow Carnegie Center (Petrov & Titkov, 2013).4 
The index is a composite measure of regional political regime variations that is both based on 
subjective expert assessments, and systematic data on electoral competition that they refer to 
as “instrumental” measures and that are conventionally employed in studies of cross-national 
democratic variations (Lankina & Getachew, 2012; Vanhanen, 2000). The “instrumental” 
criteria are measures like effective number of candidates in governor elections; the share of 
votes obtained by the winning candidate in governor elections; the rate of governor turnover; 
and recorded instances of electoral misconduct. As Petrov and Titkov readily admit, 
considering the known issue of potential subjectivity and bias in expert assessments, it is 
important to combine both the “subjective” and the “instrumental” measures in generating the 
composite index. As a further check on the validity of their measure, they cross-validate the 
“subjective” assessments with the “instrumental” measures, obtaining significant correlations 
between scores based on the two types of assessments, which are particularly strong for some 
sub-indicators.5 In what provides further reassurances of the validity of the democracy 
                                                          
4 Petrov and Titkov are currently affiliated with the Social Sciences Faculty of the Higher 
School of Economics in Moscow. Details on the sub-indicators of the index are provided in 
SA IV. 
5 The strongest correlations are observed for participation in federal elections; and regional 
electoral misconduct. Data and discussion of the indices are available from: Sotsial’nyy atlas 
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measures employed in our analysis, there is a strong degree of correspondence between 
Petrov and Titkov’s assessments and those of scholars who have relied on other measures of 
regional democratic variations. For instance, consistent with Petrov and Titkov’s findings, in 
both the studies that use “objective” measures of electoral competition and in qualitative 
scholarship relying on more “subjective” assessments, the “ethnic” republics have tended to 
feature strongly as regions that tend to have low levels of political competition and that are 
particularly likely to falsify votes in regional and federal elections (Hale, 2007; Lukinova, 
Myagkov, & Ordeshook, 2011; Myagkov, Ordeshook, & Shakin, 2009; Saikkonen, 2015).6 
Likewise, again, consistent with Petrov and Titkov’s indices, among the “Russian” oblasti, 
some regions like Samara, Nizhegorodskaia and St. Petersburg have been described as having 
comparatively more democratic political regime features (Lankina & Getachew, 2006; 
McMann, 2006; Remington, 2011; Stoner-Weiss, 1997). 
 The Petrov and Titkov score consists of ten sub-indicators, each assessed on a 5-point 
scale. The individual components of the index are then summed up to obtain a composite 
score, with higher values of the score corresponding to higher levels of regional democracy. 
The index is constructed in a way that allows to capture both the procedural elements of 
democracy (such as electoral freedoms) and its substantive aspects (political pluralism); 
overall, the logic behind the choice of sub-indicators for the score corresponds to conceptions 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
rossiyskikh regionov: Integral’nye indeksy 
http://atlas.socpol.ru/indexes/index_democr.shtml#methods (accessed 4 December 2015).  
6 Karelia, though is a notable exception to this trend. 
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of liberal democracy (Bollen, 1993).7 The democracy measure that we employ is a moving 
average score covering the years 2000-2004.8  
We capture authoritarian diffusion by analyzing trade links between the regions of 
Russia and post-soviet states. Specifically, we employ the share of trade (export and import) 
with former Soviet states (FSU) in the total trade turnover of Russia’s regions. There are two 
reasons why trade could act as a mechanism of regime diffusion. First, trade relations are 
associated with learning—both across elites and societies. In Eurasia, international trade 
transactions frequently require active participation of public officials who help to overcome 
legal and administrative barriers and to ensure the credibility of potential local business 
partners. We therefore anticipate that more intensive trade ties lead to more intensive 
exchanges among elite members of a given Russian region and the FSU country this region 
trades with. Because of widespread informal contacts between the political elites of trading 
states and regions, regional elites are likely to adapt practices and norms prevalent in the non-
democratic FSU states (Obydenkova & Libman, 2012). Second, the heavily politicized nature 
                                                          
1 The index also includes a measure for municipal independence, as well as sub-indicators of 
economic liberalization and corruption. When we recalculate the index without the sub-
indicators of economic liberalization and corruption, we obtain results similar to those 
obtained in the baseline estimation. 
8 This time frame is most appropriate for our analysis since it precedes Vladimir Putin’s major 
re-centralization drive—the abolishment of gubernatorial elections in 2004; centralist 
municipal reforms; and other initiatives that had the effect of undermining, albeit short of 
completely obliterating, political pluralism in the hitherto more democratic regions. Available 
evidence suggests however that regional political regime variations, which emerged during 
the 1990s, often persisted over the period covered in our study (Petrov & Titkov, 2013). 
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of external trade in Eurasia provides regional incumbents with an additional tool of control 
over regional economies. By withdrawing their support, governors can effectively undermine 
business transactions between companies operating in their region and the partner FSU 
country. As a result, companies in regions in which trade with FSU states is important in 
economic terms, are more likely to be interested in obtaining support of the governors—and 
exchanging it for political loyalty. (On the importance of economic control for the survival of 
Russian sub-national autocracies, see McMann, 2006).9 Note that unlike EU assistance, which 
is often conditional on good democratic performance, the impact of FSU trade on political 
regimes in the regions of Russia is mostly unintentional. The way FSU countries conduct their 
foreign trade relations in Eurasia may thus have an indirect effect on strengthening autocracy 
in Russia’s regions.  
Trade data are obtained from Russia’s official statistical compilations. In our analysis, 
FSU refers to countries formerly part of the Soviet Union, excluding the Baltic states of 
Latvia, Estonia, and Lithuania, which are now in the EU. Our analysis also excludes Belarus, 
which has a customs arrangement with Russia within the framework of the Russia-Belarus 
Union; thus, our analysis largely captures trade between Russia’s regions and Central Asian 
(Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan) and Caucasus states 
(Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia), as well as Ukraine. There is substantial variation in the share 
of Russia’s regional trade with FSU countries—ranging literally from zero to over 60 percent 
of a given region’s total trade turnover. 
                                                          
9 Because of strong soviet-era technological complementarities, post-soviet businesses are 
frequently unable to replace their soviet-era trade partners with those from other countries and 
continue production without supply or demand from the FSU.  
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 As our proxy for the EU’s democratic diffusion effect, we employ the measure of total 
volume of EU aid provided to a particular region in millions of Euros in the period between 
1991 and 2004. In our cross-sectional regressions, the FSU trade indicator is averaged over a 
five-year-period, while EU aid is aggregated for the period 1991-2004. Employing these 
measures allows us to evaluate the long-term implications of EU aid for countering post-
soviet authoritarian diffusion. Trade between Russia’s regions and FSU states is grounded in 
long-term ties, sometimes stretching over decades. The inter-elite contacts, which, as noted 
above, play an important role in authoritarian diffusion, in many cases also go back to the 
soviet era—indeed both the post-soviet countries and Russia’s sub-national regions in the 
period of our investigation often had members of the old soviet nomenklatura at the helm of 
power. Thus, in order to exercise a moderating effect on the hypothetical authoritarian 
diffusion mechanism, the EU influence should be lasting and long-term; short-term aid flows 
may be insufficient to substantially affect regional regime variations. In one of our robustness 
checks we also employ the measure of cumulative EU aid for 2000-2004.  
Aside from the main explanatory variables and their interaction terms, we also include 
a set of control variables capturing additional influences on politics in Russia’s regions. In 
particular, we control for income per capita, urbanization and education. Education is proxied 
by the share of regional population with university education, since in Russia secondary 
schooling covers virtually the entire population. These three covariates are employed based 
on the logic of classic modernization theorizing (Lipset, 1959). We also control for regional 
oil and gas extraction to account for the possibility of a “resource curse” effect, which might 
be salient given Russia’s resource-driven economy (Ross, 2001). Furthermore, we create a 
dummy variable for regions with the status of republics. The republics are regions with 
territorially-concentrated ethnic minority populations, which traditionally enjoyed higher 
status in the Soviet Union’s and in post-soviet Russia’s ethno-federal hierarchy. As noted by a 
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number of scholars, the republics had been instrumental in creating powerful political 
machines ensuring the reproduction of communist-era and early post-communist period 
regional structures of power and patronage (Golosov, 2011; Hale, 2007; Matsuzato, 2004). 
We also include a measure of the share of ethnic Russians in the regional population. This 
variable captures preference heterogeneity in Russia’s regions. In addition, we employ the 
measure of geographical distance between the regional capital and the City of Moscow in 
kilometers. More distant regions may be more difficult to control for the federal center; this in 
turn might facilitate the reproduction of powerful regional political machines.10  
 Summary statistics for the above variables are reported in the Supplementary 
Appendix (SA) IV. We obtained the data for the socio-economic control variables from 
Russian official statistical compilations. The time-varying control variables are averaged over 
the period 2000-2004. Data for the regional share of ethnic Russians and education are 
obtained from the 2000 census. In the regressions, we include Russia’s regions as our 
observations, with the exceptions of Chechnya, for which reliable data are unavailable for the 
period under investigation; and regions with autonomous okrug status, that is, those which are 
constituent units of other regions for which data are also patchy;11 Therefore, our sample 
includes seventy nine regions. 
 
                                                          
10 In the robustness checks reported in the SA I, we also add a number of further variables, 
which do not influence our main results. 
11 We include Chukotka, which is the only autonomous region which has a status 
corresponding to an oblast. 
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Main results 
We start with a brief examination of the descriptive statistics for our data.12 Table 1 splits the 
sample into four groups according to the median of the FSU trade and EU assistance 
measures. We report the democracy score, FSU trade share and EU assistance for each of the 
sub-samples. One can see that the group of regions with the highest democracy score is that 
where EU assistance had been above the median, while FSU trade share had been below the 
median. This group also includes regions like Karelia and Perm, which have frequently been 
discussed as being comparatively democratic. The lowest democracy score, conversely, is 
observed among regions with highest FSU trade levels and the lowest EU assistance levels. 
The results are consistent with our hypothesis that democratic diffusion could mitigate 
authoritarian diffusion. 
 
Table 1 about here 
 
 In the next step, we regress the variable of sub-national democracy in Russia’s regions 
on the proxy of authoritarian diffusion, on the variable of democratic diffusion from the EU, 
as well as the interaction term of these two variables. We thereby seek to ascertain whether 
the democratic diffusion variable is able to moderate the effect of authoritarian diffusion.  
 In Table 2, Model 1, we regress the democracy score on both of the baseline variables; 
Model 2 adds the interaction term. As expected, FSU trade has a negative and significant 
impact on democracy levels; EU aid has a positive and significant effect. The most interesting 
result is, however, obtained in Model 2: the interaction term is significant and positive. Thus, 
EU aid has the effect of undermining the negative effects of FSU trade. When we plot the 
                                                          
12 SA IV also reports the values of our key variables for all regions in the sample. 
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marginal effect of FSU trade on regional democracy for various values of EU aid, the results 
become even more pronounced (Figure 1). For low values of EU aid, FSU trade has a strong 
and negative impact on democracy. It does decrease in absolute value if EU aid goes up and 
eventually becomes insignificant (the zero is within confidence intervals). The insignificant 
effect, however, is observed for relatively few regions with very large volumes of EU aid: the 
cities of Moscow and St. Petersburg, Republic of Karelia, as well as the Kemerovo, Nizhny 
Novgorod, Novosibirsk, and Sverdlovsk oblasti. The figure also suggests that—
hypothetically—for extremely high EU aid values, FSU trade would have a significant and 
positive effect on the democracy score. However, there are no regions in our sample for which 
EU aid is large enough to make the marginal effect of FSU trade positive and significant: 
even for the region with the highest EU aid volumes, the effect of FSU trade is still 
insignificant. Thus, for the actual sample that we employ, the positive effect of FSU trade on 
democracy is never observed; for most regions, EU aid appears to have the effect of merely 
decreasing the negative democratic effects of FSU trade, but short of rendering it entirely 
insignificant. 
 Models 3-5 provide a number of important robustness checks. The rationales for these 
tests are as follows. First, it is possible that the effect of aid on political regimes depends not 
only on the trade partner, but also on the industrial structure of trade, which could influence 
the likelihood and importance of inter-elite contacts and elite capture of trade. Unfortunately, 
Russian official statistical compilations do not report the industrial breakdown of FSU and 
non-FSU trade; but, information on the industrial breakdown of trade volumes in general is 
available. We are therefore able to control for the shares of various industries in the overall 
structure of trade. The results (Model 3) remain robust.  
Model 4 engages with a more important problem. Our analysis is based on the premise 
that trade with FSU states can be seen as a proxy for authoritarian diffusion. The political 
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regimes of FSU states are heterogeneous, however. While many were consolidated 
autocracies during the period of our investigation, some could have qualified as having more 
competitive regimes, though none would be accurately described as a consolidated 
democracy. The most obvious examples in this range of cases are Ukraine and Moldova, 
where political competition had been at a much higher level than in Belarus or in authoritarian 
Central Asian states like Uzbekistan or Kazakhstan. Ukraine, though, in this period was ruled 
by Leonid Kuchma who had been criticized for promoting autocratic tendencies (Way, 2005). 
Georgia could have been added to this group as well from 2003, after the Rose Revolution. 
Armenia is also occasionally considered to be a country featuring relatively more advanced 
levels of democracy, particularly when one compares it to Central Asia’s autocracies like 
Uzbekistan or Kazakhstan. Unlike Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine however, because of a 
record of low political elite turnover, it exhibits more similarities to the hegemonic 
authoritarian model established in Russia, Belarus and some other post-soviet states (Furman, 
2010).13 Since our main argument rests on the fact that FSU trade can promote authoritarian 
diffusion, we need to isolate the effect of trade with consolidated autocracies— Azerbaijan 
and the authoritarian states of Central Asia.14 
                                                          
13 Another post-soviet country, Kyrgyzstan, experienced a “color revolution” in 2005, that is, 
outside the period covered in our analysis. SA V reports the average Freedom House and 
Polity IV scores of post-soviet countries during the period of our investigation. In both the 
data sources, Armenia, Moldova, Georgia and Ukraine feature as former USSR states 
(excluding the Baltic states) with highest democracy scores.  
14 Hypothetically, an attractive option would have been to explore the relative level of 
democracy in an FSU country compared to the Russian region it trades with. However, our 
regional democracy score was developed as a comparative measure of democracy in Russia’s 
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 The Russian federal statistics agency does not provide country breakdowns for 
regional trade data; it only reports the measure of the difference between post-soviet trade and 
trade with other countries. However, country breakdowns for trade may be obtained from 
other sources. Some regional statistical bureaus publish these data. For some of Russia’s 
regions this information may be available from the offices of the Federal Customs Service, 
though the reporting standards appear to vary by federal district. Some information may be 
also obtained from occasional reports published by regional governments and from scholarly 
publications. Unfortunately, this information is collected in a very unsystematic manner. 
There is typically no consistent time series data. Some regions do not provide any information 
at all. Furthermore, frequently, regions list only their main trade partners, while failing to 
report other trade partners. Based on the heterogeneous sources available, we collected data 
on the share of regional trade with Ukraine in the total trade turnover of regions (exports plus 
imports). Ukraine is the largest post-soviet country and has been among Russia’s key trade 
partners, at least, until the recent Russia-Ukraine conflict. The data are reported in SA IV and 
are to our knowledge the first systematic attempt to gather such regional trade data for 
Russia’s regions.15  
                                                                                                                                                                                     
regions, that is, we may not directly match it with a score for cross-country comparisons, for 
instance, with a Freedom House score; the “most democratic” Russian region is certainly less 
democratic than an average EU member state. Furthermore, as Gervasoni (2010) points out, 
sub-national regimes are also conceptually different from national regimes: they may resort to 
different mechanisms of societal control, for instance, leveraging national fiscal transfers; 
they also follow different developmental logics, so direct comparisons between sub-national 
regimes and national regimes, again, could be misleading.  
15 SA II also provides detailed information on how the dataset was compiled. 
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 We could potentially employ two alternative strategies in utilizing these data. Because 
the Ukraine trade data come from various sources and are for different time periods, it may be 
difficult to accurately estimate the share of post-soviet trade with Ukraine—we may end up 
subtracting two incomparable variables from each other. Hence, first, we can simply drop 
regions with a record of large trade volumes with Ukraine and check whether our results still 
hold. If trade with Ukraine is modest enough, it should not have a major impact on regional 
regimes. For this purpose, we estimate our model (Model 4) for all of Russia’s regions, in 
which the trade share of Ukraine is below 20 percent. The results for our main variable FSU 
trade hold, suggesting that they are driven by countries others than Ukraine. In SA II, we also 
employ the—imperfect—alternative strategy whereby we control for the share of trade with 
Ukraine. Again, the main findings reported above remain robust after isolating the impact of 
trade with Ukraine.  
 The three other trade partners that we singled out as having comparatively more 
democratic political regimes, namely Georgia, Armenia and Moldova, are less problematic for 
us than is Ukraine in terms of data analysis. In the 2000-2004 period covered in our study, 
Moldova was in an extremely poor economic shape; not a single Russian region reported 
substantial trade volumes with this country. The same applies to Armenia. Both countries, 
unlike Ukraine or Georgia, also lack common borders with Russia. Georgia, which does share 
borders with Russia, also remained an insignificant trade partner, even for neighboring 
Russia’s regions. For instance, in Stavropol krai, in 2000-2004, the share of trade with 
Georgia in the overall regional trade volume was a mere 8.1 percent. There is, however, one 
region that constitutes an exception: Northern Ossetia reported Georgia as a predominant 
trade partner. This is due to the republic’s geographic location: it is convenient to cross the 
Caucasian Mountains separating Russia from Georgia at the North Ossetian-Georgian border. 
The trade statistics, however, are largely driven by trade flows that go via the un-recognized 
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break-away entity of South Ossetia. Before the 2008 Russo-Georgia War, South Ossetia 
functioned as a large semi-formal trade hub, with its large Ergneti whole-sale market serving 
as “the most flourishing trading entrepôt in the Caucasus” (De Waal, 2010: 199); most likely, 
the data we have capture the semi-formal aspect of trade. In Model 5, we drop Northern 
Ossetia, but our results still hold. Thus, we have reasons to believe that the authoritarian 
diffusion effect that we report is driven in particular by trade with non-democratic post-soviet 
countries, especially Azerbaijan and Central Asian states.  
In SA II, we report results with controls for regional trade with another important 
authoritarian external trade partner, China. We rely on the same approach to create this 
variable as we did for Ukraine. Specifically, we screened all the publicly available regional 
statistical compilations; customs services reports; and regional government data. We thereby 
obtain unique and important data that, to our knowledge has not been gathered and analyzed 
by other scholars. China plays an important role in the trade relations of some of Russia’s 
regions: thus, more than 75 percent of trade of the Far Eastern Amur oblast and Tyva is with 
China. Regional governors have an impact on trade with the Asian neighbor in that, for 
instance, they often lobby for the selection of their regions to house customs offices and 
infrastructure like bridges and roads, thereby “channeling” trade with China to their regions; 
in some cases governors also have strong personal business ties with China.16 At the same 
time, trade with China is not rooted in long-term historical ties comparable to those 
connecting Russia to FSU states. In many cases, regional trade links with China started 
developing only after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Russia’s federal authorities may also 
impose stricter monitoring of trade flows with China than they would with regard to trade 
                                                          
16 Author interview with a Russian expert on the economy of the Far East, conducted online 
on 28 September 2015. 
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with FSU states for security or other reasons related to Russia’s foreign policy in its Asian 
neighborhood. These factors might explain why trade with China does not have a significant 
impact on regional democracy in our analysis. Our main results remain robust when we 
control for this variable. 
 
Geographical measure of authoritarian diffusion 
We also employ a different variable that captures potential authoritarian diffusion effects in 
the post-soviet space and that is associated with geographic location of Russia’s regions. For 
this purpose, we employ a dummy variable for regions located at the borders to FSU states as 
our explanatory variable. It is plausible to hypothesize that the diffusion effect is particularly 
strong in regions adjacent to other post-Soviet countries. Two channels could in this case 
contribute to the diffusion effect. First, there may be intensive micro-level interactions, for 
instance, involving soviet-era diasporas, as well as small cross-border movements of goods 
and people, which contribute to the diffusion of norms and values. Second, political elites in 
border regions may engage in more active interactions with elites in neighboring post-soviet 
states than would be the case with more distant states. Many regional economic issues could 
be only resolved through cooperation with neighboring states/ regions, as would be the case 
with the maintenance of soviet-era shared infrastructure or environmental issues. 
Furthermore, the period of our investigation is characterized by active and institutionalized 
cross-border cooperation, which had been partly supported by the federal government 
(Golunov, 2005). 
 Empirically, we observe that border regions trade with FSU states much more than do 
the non-border regions: the average share of FSU trade in the border regions is 31 percent, as 
compared to 13 percent in the rest of the sample, and the difference is statistically significant. 
However, these patterns notwithstanding, the effect of geographic location on the level of 
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democracy in Russia’s regions is strikingly different from that of trade. Table 3 replicates our 
regressions for this variable and we observe no significant results for either the FSU border 
trade dummy variable, or for the interaction term with EU aid. In Table 4, we report the 
results of models that contain further modifications: in line with the discussion above, we 
create a dummy variable for regions bordering an FSU country with a consolidated 
authoritarian regime (Belarus, Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan), but still find no significant border 
effect. This result clearly confirms the importance of the trade channel of authoritarian 
diffusion. In fact, while on average border regions trade more with FSU countries than those 
in the rest of the sample, there is still substantial heterogeneity in border region trade volumes 
with neighboring states. Specifically, the range of trade share with all post-Soviet countries in 
overall regional trade volumes for this group goes from 1 percent for Ingushetia and 3 percent 
for Pskov to 68 percent for Altai Krai; most likely, it is this variation that determines our 
results.  
 
Tables 2-4 about here 
  
Robustness tests 
We perform a number of additional empirical tests, which we report in SA III. Here, we 
highlight the most important findings. First, we look at the effects of our key variables for 
individual dimensions of the democracy index. We observe significant effects of the 
interaction term EU aid and FSU trade with regard to five dimensions of the democracy 
index: economic liberalization; political pluralism; elite composition; civil society; and 
municipal autonomy. The latter three dimensions may be particularly important for 
understanding the specific mechanisms through which EU aid might help counteract the 
effects of authoritarian diffusion. Hypothetically, EU aid can be associated with two effects: it 
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may provide regional actors with additional sources of financing and support; and it may 
enable the socialization of regional politicians in EU democratic values. The first dimension 
of EU assistance may be particularly relevant for civil society development. At the same time, 
by socializing regional elites, the EU may encourage them to be more inclined to tolerate 
regional intra-elite pluralism. Likewise, given the EU’s focus on democracy, we would expect 
regional administrations participating in EU aid projects to be more willing to accept 
municipal autonomy.  
 These conjectures are corroborated in further robustness checks. Instead of employing 
the volume of EU aid measure, we employ the alternative measure of number of EU-funded 
projects carried out in the regions. 17 In particular, we look at the number of projects that the 
EU implemented in a particular region with the participation of different types of actors, 
namely NGOs, regional governments, municipal authorities and federal authorities. The EU’s 
moderating effect is associated with two types of projects: those involving NGOs, and those 
with regional governments as key local partners. Projects involving federal and local 
governments do not appear to have the same effect. The results pertaining to projects 
featuring NGOs as key local partners are in line with the hypothetical, civil society channel of 
EU influence noted above. The effect of projects involving regional governments as key local 
partners is also in line with the elite socialization and circulation processes discussed above. 
The result with respect to municipalities is somewhat surprising, but may be explicable given 
the role that regional governors—who in many regions tend to serve as gatekeepers when it 
comes to authorizing political or economic activity (Golosov, 2011; Hale, 2015; Kynev, 2006; 
                                                          
17 EU projects are often low-budget, but may nevertheless make a substantial difference in 
resource-poor regional contexts as when for instance computer and broadband resources are 
provided to a financially struggling NGO.  
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Reuter & Remington, 2009; Sharafutdinova, 2011)—may play in authorizing and monitoring 
EU-funded municipal projects.  
Finally, we also estimate the regressions for individual components of the democracy 
index that may be particularly relevant for the purposes of our study (civil society, municipal 
autonomy and elite composition) and specific types of EU projects. In analyzing the civil 
society dimension of aid, we observe that EU involvement weakens the negative effects of 
FSU trade in projects involving NGOs, that is, projects that directly target civil society actors; 
and regional governments—in the latter case the EU may affect the environment for the 
development of civil society. For the dimensions of elite composition and municipal 
autonomy, all types of EU projects appear to be relevant, except those that feature local 
governments as key project partners. For the municipal autonomy dimension, we observe a 
direct and positive effect of EU projects involving local governments as key local partners. 
The likely channel of influence of EU aid might be through the empowering and training of 
local administrations and municipal officials; however, EU aid appears to limit the negative 
effects of FSU trade only in projects involving federal and regional governments and NGOs 
as key implementing partners. It may be the case that FSU trade adversely affects the 
development of local autonomy precisely because of the role it plays as a power tool in the 
hands of regional governments: regional administrations, controlling access to FSU trade, can 
use it to limit the power of municipalities as well. Since in many post-Soviet states with 
which Russian regions trade, the municipal level of authority is substantially weaker than in 
Russia, mutual learning again might play an important role. EU involvement, however, 
appears to weaken the above negative effect of FSU trade on regional democracy. 
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Discussion 
The preceding analysis has uncovered patterns of authoritarian diffusion in Russia’s regions, 
conditioned by trade with post-Soviet states. We also analyzed the democratic impacts of EU 
aid. In line with earlier scholarship, we find that EU aid has a significant democratizing effect 
on regional regimes. What is novel in our analysis is that we establish that EU has the 
potential to counter regional authoritarianism that may be reinforced through trade with post-
Soviet partners. We also identify some potential channels of the diffusion of authoritarian and 
democratic influences on regional democratic institutions and practices. We are able to do so 
because we disaggregate our regional democracy score into the various sub-indicators, and 
because we possess data on implementing partners for EU projects. In particular, we find that 
EU support for regional civil society actors might create conditions conducive to the 
development of checks on regional authoritarian trends. EU aid might also have the effect of 
socializing regional governors and other officials in ways that serve to increase regional 
pluralism. These effects in turn appear to mitigate the negative impact of FSU trade on 
regional democracy uncovered in our study.   
 Our analysis also suggests directions for future research. To our knowledge, the data 
on EU aid employed in the study constitute the most refined measures on EU engagement in 
the post-Soviet region that are available. Most scholars working with EU aid data—as indeed 
those analyzing global aid flows—employ national level aggregates of volumes of aid 
allocated without distinguishing between implementing partners or disaggregating aid data at 
the level of sub-national regions. Obtaining sub-national data capturing authoritarian diffusion 
processes presents even greater challenges. Authoritarian states are known to be more 
secretive than democracies and any officially published data are bound to be unreliable. For 
instance, it is well-known that Russia has been allocating vast amounts of funding to NGOs, 
media outlets, and religious groups in post-Soviet states as part of its “soft power” agenda. 
30 
 
There are however no systematic data on Russian or other regional autocracies’ targeted 
activities of this kind that would be similar in scope to the EU data employed in the study. We 
are aware that our FSU trade data are at best an imperfect proxy for the “spontaneous” 
authoritarian diffusion processes analyzed in this paper. Nevertheless, our analysis constitutes 
an important step in the direction of systematically analyzing authoritarian diffusion 
processes, in which trade apparently plays a significant role. It complements qualitative 
analyses that have focused on the efforts of major authoritarian players like Russia and China 
to “diffusion proof” (Koesel & Bunce, 2013) against democracy; or case studies of 
authoritarian socialization processes (Allison, 2008; Collins, 2009). Furthermore, in what is 
different from other studies of authoritarian diffusion, our analysis shines the spotlight on the 
regional authoritarian effects-through-trade of such lesser regional autocracies like Central 
Asian dictatorships and Azerbaijan. Analyzing authoritarian diffusion processes employing 
alternative proxies of autocratic diffusion, and more precisely ascertaining how major and 
minor authoritarian players might influence regime dynamics in other states and regions, is an 
agenda for future research. 
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Table 1: Democracy, FSU trade and EU assistance 
 EU assistance below the median EU assistance above the median 
FSU trade below 
the median 
Average democracy score: 27.1 
Average FSU trade: 4.5% 
Average EU assistance: 0.13 mln € 
Examples: Krasnodar, Primorsky 
 
Average democracy score: 33.6 
Average FSU trade: 5.8% 
Average EU assistance: 20.43 mln € 
Examples Karelia, Perm 
FSU trade above 
the median 
Average democracy score: 24.7 
Average FSU trade: 31.3% 
Average EU assistance: 0.15 mln € 
Examples: Dagestan, Stavropol 
 
Average democracy score: 30.8 
Average FSU trade: 32.7% 
Average EU assistance: 11.50 mln € 
Examples: Ivanovo, Rostov 
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Table 2: Baseline results for FSU trade. Dependent variable: Democracy index, 2000-
2004, OLS 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
EU aid, cumulative 0.124*** 0.091** 0.083* 0.089** 0.087* 
 (0.041) (0.044) (0.047) (0.043) (0.046) 
FSU trade -6.029** -8.100*** -5.132 -7.677** -8.052*** 
 (2.677) (2.964) (3.119) (3.722) (2.966) 
EU aid * FSU trade  0.187** 0.173* 0.192** 0.190** 
  (0.084) (0.092) (0.084) (0.085) 
Education -29.792 -27.477 -22.224 -38.518 -23.687 
 (23.429) (23.625) (25.704) (29.696) (25.233) 
Income per capita 0.111 0.129 0.135 0.378 0.074 
 (0.409) (0.414) (0.439) (0.592) (0.430) 
Share of ethnic Russians 8.409* 8.333 5.286 4.143 7.917 
 (4.922) (5.048) (5.625) (7.510) (5.187) 
Dummy republic 0.866 0.924 0.058 -0.92 0.916 
 (2.331) (2.377) (2.564) (3.278) (2.395) 
Distance from Moscow -0.356* -0.432** -0.381 -0.591* -0.426** 
 (0.197) (0.211) (0.253) (0.298) (0.211) 
Oil and gas 0.005** 0.005* 0.004 0.067 0.005* 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.088) (0.002) 
Urbanization 12.775** 12.931** 15.471* 11.471 13.540** 
 (6.308) (6.376) (7.770) (7.591) (6.528) 
Structure of foreign trade      
Share of agricultural 
products   2.552   
   (6.569)   
Share of energy   3.266   
   (4.789)   
Share of petrochemical 
products    9.614   
   (5.773)   
Share of wood products   10.236   
   (6.612)   
Share of metals   2.571   
   (5.516)   
Share of machinery   1.15   
   (5.548)   
Constant 19.129*** 19.181*** 14.935* 25.675** 18.670*** 
 (6.289) (6.410) (8.114) (9.740) (6.449) 
Observations 79 79 79 57 78 
R-squared 0.495 0.505 0.539 0.465 0.49 
Regions with share of 
Ukraine trade > 20% 
excluded    Yes  
Northern Ossetia excluded     Yes 
Note: robust standard errors in parentheses. *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * 
significant at 10%. 
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Table 3: Baseline results for dummy, FSU border regions. Dependent variable: 
Democracy index, 2000-2004, OLS 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
EU aid, cumulative 0.124*** 0.120** 0.116*** 0.119** 
 (0.038) (0.045) (0.038) (0.045) 
Dummy FSU border 0.458 0.341   
 (1.347) (1.477)   
Dummy FSU border with autocracies   2.253 2.358 
   (1.511) (1.654) 
EU aid * dummy FSU border  0.017   
  (0.046)   
EU aid * dummy FSU border with  
autocracies    -0.014 
    (0.047) 
Education -33.755 -33.22 -29.76 -29.846 
 (23.562) (24.095) (24.562) (24.758) 
Income per capita 0.259 0.266 0.245 0.236 
 (0.430) (0.438) (0.417) (0.423) 
Share of ethnic Russians 8.537 8.432 8.966* 9.017* 
 (5.121) (5.222) (4.684) (4.712) 
Dummy republic 1.596 1.569 2.243 2.254 
 (2.611) (2.652) (2.476) (2.485) 
Distance from Moscow -0.243 -0.254 -0.226 -0.218 
 (0.186) (0.197) (0.184) (0.193) 
Oil and gas 0.005* 0.005* 0.003 0.003 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Urbanization 15.576** 15.591** 17.082*** 17.026*** 
 (7.067) (7.157) (6.279) (6.283) 
Constant 15.554** 15.579** 13.112* 13.114* 
 (7.232) (7.309) (6.781) (6.811) 
Observations 79 79 79 79 
R-squared 0.474 0.475 0.49 0.491 
Note: see Table 2. 
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Figure 1: Marginal effects of FSU trade on democracy in Russia’s regions conditional on 
EU aid, Model 2, Table 2 
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SUPPLEMENTARY APPENDIX NOT FOR PUBLICATION 
SUPPLEMENTARY APPENDIX NOT FOR PUBLICATION 
I. Additional econometric tests: control variables 
The objective of these tests is to ascertain whether our main results for both trade and border region variables are 
robust to the inclusion of a number of additional controls. Specifically, we include the following variables: 
 Dummy variable for Northern Caucasus republics. These regions have been strongly affected by the echoes 
of the Chechen war and often receive special treatment by the federal government in what some scholars 
have labeled the “internal abroad” phenomenon (Trenin 2011).  
 Size of the region, as measured by territory and population. The rationale for including this variable is as 
follows. First, the magnitude of EU aid may be higher in more populous regions. Second, we expect larger 
regions to experience greater pressures to devolve more power to municipalities. Given that one of the sub-
indicators of our democracy index captures municipal autonomy, it is important for us to incorporate 
regional size into our analysis. 
 Dummy variable for regions with Muslim majority populations given that some scholars have hypothesized 
that there may be a negative association between Islam and democracy (Fish 2002). 
 A proxy for trade openness. We measure the trade openness as the share of total exports and imports in 
regional GDP. This variable is conventionally employed in cross-national studies of development and 
democracy, though the findings as to the direction of its influence on these variables are ambiguous (Milner 
and Mukherjee 2010). It is particularly important for us to employ trade openness as a control variable since 
our main explanatory variable is the share of FSU trade in total regional trade volume. 
 Regional dependence on federal fiscal transfers, as measured by the share of federal transfers in regional 
expenditures in 2000-2004. Gervasoni (2010) has shown how federal transfers might have detrimental 
effects on sub-national democracy. On the other hand, regional patterns of engagement in EU-funded 
projects might be affected by the degree of regional dependence on federal funding. The results of this 
regression do not contradict our findings. 
 We also estimate a specification, where we exclude either the variable of share of ethnic Russians or the 
republic dummy variable, since these two variables are correlated and keeping them at the same time could 
cause multicollinearity problems. 
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Table A1: Results for FSU trade, additional control variables. Dependent variable: Index of democracy, 
2000-2004, OLS 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
EU aid, cumulative 0.096* 0.093** 0.083* 0.085** 0.089** 0.081* 0.083* 0.097** 
 (0.049) (0.045) (0.043) (0.042) (0.043) (0.044) (0.044) (0.043) 
FSU trade -7.996*** -8.244*** -7.415** -7.564** -7.026** -7.179** -7.391** -6.402** 
 (2.968) (2.914) (3.032) (2.946) (2.903) (3.122) (3.021) (3.204) 
EU aid * FSU trade 0.191** 0.186** 0.201** 0.178** 0.164** 0.203** 0.201** 0.150* 
 (0.090) (0.086) (0.083) (0.075) (0.079) (0.085) (0.083) (0.087) 
Education -36.045 -28.077 -28.419 -39.807 -34.81 -26.256 -27.594 -25.926 
 (24.305) (23.709) (23.720) (29.299) (28.757) (24.006) (25.996) (22.254) 
Income per capita 0.072 0.117 0.142 -0.019 -0.27 0.084 0.13 -0.056 
 (0.493) (0.429) (0.418) (0.415) (0.363) (0.428) (0.445) (0.363) 
Share of ethnic 
Russians  6.976** 8.367 8.654* 8.109* 6.043 8.159 5.233 
  (3.165) (5.196) (4.934) (4.829) (5.509) (5.760) (5.353) 
Dummy republic -2.439  1.054 1.511 0.948 1.034 1.028 0.34 
 (1.547)  (2.481) (2.473) (2.373) (2.479) (2.484) (2.425) 
Distance from Moscow -0.484** -0.440** -0.414* -0.281 -0.462* -0.439** -0.414* -0.171 
 (0.202) (0.209) (0.211) (0.229) (0.247) (0.209) (0.212) (0.207) 
Oil and gas 0.003 0.004* 0.004* 0.004* 0.001 0.004* 0.004* 0.003 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Urbanization 16.133** 12.658* 13.325** 12.952** 13.482** 13.360** 13.269** 7.881 
 (6.964) (6.454) (6.325) (6.125) (6.327) (6.071) (6.333) (6.035) 
Openness to foreign 
trade   31.537 34.826 34.406 30.277 31.178  
   (27.350) (26.205) (25.599) (27.275) (27.936)  
Population    0.001 0.001    
    (0.001) (0.001)    
Territory     3.347***    
     (1.204)    
Dummy Islamic region      -3.097   
      (2.665)   
Dummy Northern 
Caucasus       -0.293  
       (3.138)  
Fiscal transfers        -9.317** 
        (4.315) 
Constant 25.977*** 20.833*** 18.397*** 19.335*** 19.266*** 20.319*** 18.528*** 27.230*** 
 (5.182) (4.845) (6.819) (6.748) (6.377) (7.222) (6.967) (6.947) 
Observations 79 79 79 79 79 79 79 79 
R-squared 0.479 0.504 0.509 0.523 0.565 0.52 0.509 0.534 
Note: see Table 2. 
SUPPLEMENTARY APPENDIX NOT FOR PUBLICATION 
Table A2: Results for dummy FSU border region, additional control variables. Dependent variable: Index 
of democracy, 2000-2004, OLS 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
EU aid, 
cumulative (0.049) (0.046) (0.042) (0.041) (0.041) (0.043) (0.044) (0.044) 
 -0.269 0.031 0.303 0.104 0.399 0.414 0.389 0.438 
Dummy FSU 
border (1.379) (1.361) (1.447) (1.450) (1.448) (1.442) (1.455) (1.416) 
 0.032 0.02 0.034 0.032 0.023 0.033 0.032 0.009 
EU aid * Dummy 
FSU border (0.048) (0.047) (0.043) (0.042) (0.043) (0.043) (0.042) (0.046) 
 -39.667 -33.391 -34.018 -44.599 -39.698 -31.872 -32.096 -30.532 
Education (24.848) (24.395) (24.108) (29.053) (28.390) (24.486) (26.637) (22.342) 
 0.197 0.244 0.266 0.111 -0.154 0.200 0.234 0.018 
Income per 
capita (0.520) (0.468) (0.434) (0.435) (0.381) (0.442) (0.456) (0.373) 
 -2.002  1.681 2.046 1.573 1.701 1.656 0.821 
Dummy republic (1.606)  (2.760) (2.751) (2.624) (2.780) (2.763) (2.715) 
  6.143** 8.478 8.612 8.25 6.072 8.002 4.904 
Share of ethnic 
Russians  (3.017) (5.406) (5.269) (5.140) (5.694) (5.760) (5.610) 
 -0.324* -0.271 -0.248 -0.123 -0.317 -0.276 -0.245 0.014 
Distance from 
Moscow (0.188) (0.195) (0.197) (0.214) (0.231) (0.191) (0.196) (0.187) 
 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.001 0.004 0.004 0.003 
Oil and gas (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) 
 17.722** 14.737** 15.897** 15.311** 16.153** 16.026** 15.863** 9.277 
Urbanization (7.870) (7.314) (6.944) (6.635) (6.723) (6.792) (6.923) (6.580) 
   48.592 53.523* 51.391* 46.253 47.417  
Openness to 
foreign trade   (29.989) (28.062) (27.544) (29.929) (30.038)  
    0.001 0.001    
Population    (0.001) (0.001)    
     3.508***    
Territory     (1.303)    
      -3.315   
Dummy Islamic 
region      (2.518)   
       -0.756  
Dummy 
Northern 
Caucasus       (2.915)  
        -10.916** 
Fiscal transfers        (4.199) 
 23.172*** 18.556*** 14.828* 15.952** 15.615** 16.817** 15.049* 25.609*** 
Constant (5.795) (5.324) (7.679) (7.642) (7.285) (8.003) (7.716) (7.866) 
 79 79 79 79 79 79 79 79 
Observations 0.45 0.472 0.484 0.498 0.543 0.497 0.485 0.516 
R-squared (0.049) (0.046) (0.042) (0.041) (0.041) (0.043) (0.044) (0.044) 
Note: see Table 2. 
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Table A3: Results for dummy autocratic FSU border region, additional control variables. Dependent 
variable: Index of democracy, 2000-2004, OLS 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)  
EU aid, cumulative 0.124** 0.122** 0.107** 0.105** 0.109** 0.105** 0.106** 0.120*** 
 (0.050) (0.047) (0.043) (0.041) (0.042) (0.044) (0.044) (0.044) 
Dummy FSU 
border with 
autocracies 1.965 1.998 2.247 2.027 2.283 2.137 2.239 2.394 
 (1.587) (1.587) (1.613) (1.618) (1.649) (1.645) (1.629) (1.577) 
EU aid * Dummy 
FSU border with 
autocracies -0.003 -0.012 0.003 0.003 -0.005 0.006 0.003 -0.021 
 (0.050) (0.049) (0.044) (0.042) (0.044) (0.045) (0.045) (0.046) 
Education -39.288 -31.788 -30.772 -41.035 -34.921 -28.584 -29.457 -26.86 
 (25.304) (25.107) (24.777) (30.343) (29.729) (25.103) (27.209) (22.864) 
Income per capita 0.178 0.218 0.238 0.105 -0.176 0.176 0.218 -0.015 
 (0.505) (0.465) (0.421) (0.418) (0.363) (0.431) (0.448) (0.356) 
Dummy republic -1.481  2.336 2.687 2.129 2.258 2.289 1.465 
 (1.585)  (2.582) (2.595) (2.457) (2.586) (2.589) (2.567) 
Share of ethnic 
Russians  5.742* 9.052* 9.218* 8.726* 6.698 8.722 5.428 
  (2.902) (4.875) (4.772) (4.586) (5.312) (5.542) (5.161) 
Distance from 
Moscow -0.284 -0.237 -0.214 -0.1 -0.303 -0.245 -0.214 0.048 
 (0.186) (0.193) (0.192) (0.209) (0.226) (0.189) (0.193) (0.186) 
Oil and gas 0.002 0.003 0.003 0.003 -0.001 0.003 0.003 0.001 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) 
Urbanization 20.102*** 16.170** 17.263*** 16.851*** 17.457*** 17.137*** 17.156*** 10.592* 
 (6.871) (6.543) (6.175) (5.967) (6.027) (6.032) (6.192) (5.728) 
Openness to foreign 
trade   45.529* 50.344* 47.918* 43.601 44.862  
   (26.941) (25.986) (25.208) (27.417) (27.647)  
Population    0.001 0.001    
    (0.001) (0.001)    
Territory     3.601**    
     (1.359)    
Dummy Islamic 
region      -3.094   
      (2.472)   
Dummy Northern 
Caucasus       -0.462  
       (2.843)  
Fiscal transfers        -10.929*** 
        (4.076) 
Constant 20.889*** 17.285*** 12.493* 13.462* 13.313* 14.660* 12.726* 23.272*** 
 (5.510) (5.124) (7.131) (7.160) (6.745) (7.487) (7.297) (7.575) 
Observations 79 79 79 79 79 79 79 79 
R-squared 0.461 0.484 0.499 0.51 0.558 0.511 0.499 0.532 
Note: see Table 2. 
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II. Additional econometric tests: trade with Ukraine and with China 
 
The objective of these tests is to ascertain whether our main result is driven by trade with Ukraine; and whether 
trade with China affects regional democratic variations. These trade flows are measured as the share of Ukraine 
(China) in the total trade turnover (export plus import). The regressions are constructed in the following way. In 
the first three specifications, we use our baseline regression, but also control for trade with Ukraine/ China. Since 
the data for Ukraine/ China trade come from different time periods, we also need to isolate possible time-specific 
shocks driving the variation in trade share. We therefore also run a model incorporating dummy variables for the 
time periods for which trade share was computed: 2000-2004, 2005-2009 and 2010-2012. These variables 
capture the time-specific effects influencing trade share. Furthermore, we also incorporate variables capturing 
different sources of data (statistical offices and customs; the remaining sources are used as the baseline 
category).  We do so because different sources can have systematic biases in reported trade flows. We then run 
three specifications, also controlling for time periods and for sources of data, where trade with FSU states is 
dropped and only trade with Ukraine/ China is included. Finally, we also run three additional specifications, in 
which only trade with Ukraine / China is included, as well as an interaction term of the respective shares of trade 
and EU aid. 
As noted in the paper, our main results for trade share with FSU states are confirmed, even after controlling for 
trade with Ukraine or China. Trade with China has no impact on regional democratic variations in Russia. Trade 
with Ukraine has a significant and negative impact on sub-national democracy. This is an interesting result, 
which may be interpreted as follows. First, as noted in the paper, during the period covered in our study, which 
coincides with the presidency of Leonid Kuchma, Ukraine could not be characterized as having a full-fledged 
democratic regime. Second, our results may reflect the dominance of oligarchic groups in Ukraine, which played 
an important role in the country’s politics and foreign trade. These oligarchic groups, due to their typically close 
ties with political leaders, tend to rely on Russian regional administrations to facilitate business transactions in 
specific regions. Third, and more importantly, some of Russia’s regions have particularly intensive trade ties 
with the more industrialized regions of Eastern Ukraine. These Ukrainian regions, during the period covered in 
our study, had been characterized by powerful political machines with strong business ties (D’Anieri 2005; 
Kuzio 2015). Thus, trade with Ukraine appears to be trade with an autocracy if we consider the nature of 
Ukraine’s regional regimes with ties to Russian regions.  
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Table A4: Results for trade with Ukraine. Dependent variable: Index of democracy, 2000-2004, OLS  
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
EU aid, 
cumulative 0.079* 0.076* 0.081** 0.113*** 0.108*** 0.110*** 0.099** 0.096* 0.098* 
 (0.040) (0.040) (0.040) (0.039) (0.039) (0.040) (0.048) (0.051) (0.049) 
FSU trade  -5.941 -6.15 -5.563       
 (3.604) (3.674) (3.636)       
EU aid * FSU 
trade 0.205** 0.196** 0.189**       
 (0.078) (0.091) (0.091)       
Trade with 
Ukraine  -9.731** -10.043** -9.749** -12.219*** -13.059*** -12.244*** -12.944*** -13.675*** -12.809*** 
 (4.403) (4.890) (4.581) (3.684) (3.995) (3.785) (3.854) (4.069) (3.882) 
EU aid * 
Trade with 
Ukraine       0.245 0.21 0.202 
       (0.506) (0.551) (0.546) 
Education -30.854 -28.061 -31.584 -33.284 -30.148 -33.599 -33.24 -29.943 -33.633 
 (26.628) (28.754) (27.020) (26.889) (29.159) (27.341) (27.367) (29.609) (27.792) 
Income per 
capita 0.274 0.181 0.407 0.332 0.195 0.464 0.325 0.184 0.465 
 (0.556) (0.649) (0.565) (0.567) (0.663) (0.587) (0.585) (0.676) (0.601) 
Share of 
ethnic 
Russians 7.008 6.711 6.772 6.593 6.122 6.062 6.442 6.052 5.979 
 (5.591) (5.961) (5.715) (5.252) (5.655) (5.449) (5.341) (5.730) (5.514) 
Dummy 
republic 0.559 0.33 0.186 0.582 0.41 -0.009 0.607 0.454 0.028 
 (2.686) (2.860) (2.843) (2.749) (2.934) (2.918) (2.799) (2.978) (2.964) 
Distance from 
Moscow -0.619** -0.658** -0.669** -0.493* -0.556* -0.596** -0.507* -0.562* -0.604** 
 (0.292) (0.305) (0.305) (0.276) (0.291) (0.286) (0.283) (0.296) (0.291) 
Oil and gas 0.082 0.079 0.096 0.085 0.08 0.103 0.084 0.08 0.103 
 (0.080) (0.087) (0.094) (0.079) (0.085) (0.092) (0.081) (0.086) (0.094) 
Urbanization 12.421* 13.710* 11.499 12.671* 15.080** 12.420* 12.918* 15.196** 12.463 
 (6.828) (7.271) (7.175) (6.936) (7.418) (7.323) (7.127) (7.544) (7.456) 
Constant 21.863*** 15.972* 21.082*** 21.083*** 15.165* 20.014** 21.116*** 15.146* 20.057** 
 (7.545) (8.563) (7.839) (7.553) (8.654) (7.876) (7.627) (8.718) (7.944) 
Observations 65 65 65 65 65 65 65 65 65 
R-squared 0.531 0.542 0.534 0.511 0.524 0.518 0.512 0.525 0.519 
Time period 
dummies  Yes   Yes   Yes  
Source 
dummies   Yes   Yes   Yes 
Note: see Table 2. 
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Table A5: Results for trade with China. Dependent variable: Index of democracy, 2000-2004, OLS  
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
EU aid, 
cumulative 0.065 0.057 0.065 0.104** 0.098** 0.101** 0.104 0.103 0.109 
 (0.048) (0.047) (0.048) (0.045) (0.045) (0.047) (0.079) (0.078) (0.080) 
FSU trade  -8.694** -9.352** -8.521**       
 (3.482) (3.492) (3.457)       
EU aid * FSU 
trade 0.264*** 0.271*** 0.261**       
 (0.091) (0.097) (0.101)       
Trade with 
China  -1.795 -2.479 -1.96 0.737 0.035 0.043 0.736 0.047 0.05 
 (4.263) (4.528) (4.488) (4.252) (4.564) (4.515) (4.271) (4.617) (4.569) 
EU aid * 
Trade with 
China       0.002 -0.031 -0.049 
       (0.292) (0.301) (0.312) 
Education -20.622 -20.736 -21.151 -23.967 -24.47 -23.887 -23.982 -24.137 -23.386 
 (26.773) (28.711) (27.602) (27.435) (29.368) (28.154) (27.154) (29.189) (27.949) 
Income per 
capita 1.806* 1.830* 1.834* 2.151** 2.171** 2.141** 2.152** 2.146** 2.111** 
 (0.919) (0.914) (0.946) (0.898) (0.913) (0.914) (0.923) (0.923) (0.941) 
Share of 
ethnic 
Russians 5.821 5.227 5.633 5.54 4.706 5.017 5.54 4.712 5.015 
 (5.894) (6.165) (6.001) (5.496) (5.845) (5.743) (5.548) (5.901) (5.796) 
Dummy 
republic -0.419 -0.884 -0.403 -0.041 -0.388 -0.167 -0.04 -0.405 -0.215 
 (2.625) (2.772) (2.703) (2.653) (2.834) (2.793) (2.685) (2.856) (2.804) 
Distance from 
Moscow -0.748* -0.799** -0.775* -0.705* -0.759* -0.747* -0.706* -0.751* -0.736* 
 (0.379) (0.375) (0.386) (0.381) (0.381) (0.389) (0.393) (0.389) (0.401) 
Oil and gas 0.04 0.034 0.033 0.042 0.033 0.036 0.042 0.034 0.038 
 (0.080) (0.088) (0.096) (0.078) (0.085) (0.094) (0.079) (0.084) (0.095) 
Urbanization 4.047 4.307 4.348 5.058 6.611 6.496 5.062 6.632 6.46 
 (7.401) (7.980) (7.822) (7.945) (8.639) (8.355) (7.964) (8.732) (8.402) 
Constant 22.611*** 18.357** 23.309*** 19.512*** 15.578* 19.985** 19.510** 15.517* 19.969** 
 (7.497) (8.407) (8.563) (7.305) (8.349) (8.442) (7.394) (8.413) (8.538) 
Observations 64 64 64 64 64 64 64 64 64 
R-squared 0.548 0.562 0.549 0.51 0.521 0.514 0.51 0.521 0.515 
Time period 
dummies  Yes   Yes   Yes  
Source 
dummies   Yes   Yes   Yes 
Note: see Table 2. 
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III. Further robustness checks and econometric concerns 
 
1. We disaggregate the dependent variable, looking at the effect of EU aid and FSU trade on individual 
components of the democracy index. 
2. We employ a number of alternative indicators to explore the EU democratic diffusion effect. In particular, we 
modify the time frame for measuring EU aid effects and the size of the sample. First, we rerun the baseline 
specification, excluding regions which received no EU aid over the 1991-2001 period. It is possible that these 
regions have unobserved characteristics which could bias our results. The interaction effect remains highly 
significant and keeps the predicted sign. Second, we seek to ensure temporal overlap in our EU data with other 
time-variant variables and employ an alternative measure of average annual EU aid for the 2000-2004 period. In 
this alternative specification the interaction term becomes insignificant, although the EU aid variable remains 
positive and significant. This result may indicate that EU aid counteracts the negative effects of FSU trade on 
regional democracy only in the long term, through some form of a persistence effect. When we experiment with 
dropping the regions which received no EU aid in 2000-2004, we find that the interaction term again becomes 
significant. 
3. We use an alternative proxy of EU aid, namely the number of projects implemented by the EU in individual 
regions. We also look at individual types of projects depending on the project partner and investigate their effect 
for the aggregate democracy score and for the score’s sub-components. 
4. In our baseline analysis, we assumed that FSU trade ties may have an over-time constraining effect on 
democracy in Russia’s regions. However, this assumption may be considered simplistic. In some cases, large 
volumes of FSU trade may reflect short-term trends—for instance, favorable market conditions for particular 
goods in specific years—rather than long-term trade interdependencies. We therefore compute a coefficient of 
variation of the annual share of FSU trade in regional GDP in 2000-2004. This variable shows the extent of year-
to-year fluctuations in FSU trade relative to average FSU trade volumes. If this variable is large, it means that the 
contribution of FSU trade to regional GDP varies substantially from year to year. If it is small, we conclude that 
its contribution to regional GDP is relatively constant. (We examine the coefficient of variation since we need to 
normalize the standard deviation of FSU trade contribution to GDP; otherwise, we will encounter the issue of 
regions with larger FSU trade also, by definition, having larger trade variation in absolute terms).  
Thus, for small coefficients of variation, FSU trade may be more likely to constitute a factor conducive in the 
longer term to the development of authoritarian tendencies in Russia’s regions. To deal with this problem, we 
split the regions into two groups with high and low coefficients of variation (we use mean and median values as 
cutoffs) and replicate the regressions for each of these groups. If we split the sample according to the mean, the 
interaction term is insignificant in both the sub-samples. However, when we split the sample along the median, 
the interaction term is significant and positive in the sub-sample with low variation of EU aid. Thus, we show 
that EU aid indeed mitigates the negative impact of FSU trade on democracy in the sub-sample in which FSU 
trade exhibits smaller variation, that is, where FSU trade is more likely to have a facilitating effect on regional 
authoritarianism. 
5. We also need to address various endogeneity concerns. To begin with, reverse causality may be potentially at 
work. If that were the case, it would be the specific nature of regional political regimes, which attracts EU aid 
and FSU trade, rather than EU aid and FSU trade influencing regional regimes. In order to address this problem, 
we replace the key explanatory variables by their lags. For EU aid, we employ data for 1991-1999; for FSU trade 
we employ data for 1997 (the earliest period available); we also drop the region of Buriatia, which in 1997 
experienced a surprising jump in FSU trade to the level of 66 percent of total trade turnover, while already in 
1998 the region’s FSU trade levels went down to 14 percent and subsequently remained less than 10 percent, in 
1999-2004. The results are confirmed.  
A further area of concern is that regions with more FSU trade may be those less likely to attract or, or be 
interested in attracting, EU aid. The correlation coefficient between our variables measuring FSU trade share and 
EU aid is minus 0.0366, which makes a relation between these two characteristics insignificant. However, as a 
further robustness check, we also run a cross-sectional time-series regression, where EU aid (annual inflow) is 
regressed on FSU trade for the 1997-2004 period. We run several specifications: simple pooled OLS regression, 
where contemporaneous EU aid is regressed on FSU trade; pooled OLS, where EU aid in year t is regressed on 
lagged FSU trade in year t-1; similar regressions excluding Buriatia; and regressions using region fixed effects. 
We do not find a significant effect of FSU trade, contemporaneous or lagged, on EU aid.  
6. In the baseline specifications, we employ the measure of average income per capita for 2000-2004 obtained by 
simple averaging of annual nominal income levels. Considering that in 2000-2004, Russia experienced rapid 
economic growth, accompanied by high inflation, we also use an alternative variable: we compute the average 
income for 2000-2004 averaging annual income levels in constant for prices in the year 2000 (and employ the 
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CPI inflation indicator published by Nezavisimaya Finansovaya Ekspertiza for this purpose). The results do not 
change as well. 
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Table A6: Results for individual components of the democracy index 
 
 EU aid FSU trade EU aid * FSU trade 
 beta s.e. beta s.e. beta s.e. 
Openness 0.014** (0.006) -0.131 (0.514) 0.003 (0.013) 
Elections 0.009* (0.005) -0.295 (0.658) 0.018 (0.013) 
Pluralism 0.003 (0.006) -0.667 (0.481) 0.032** (0.012) 
Media 0.016*** (0.005) -0.834* (0.456) -0.01 (0.013) 
Economic liberalization 0.001 (0.005) -0.965* (0.559) 0.035*** (0.011) 
Civil society 0.015*** (0.005) -0.938** (0.422) 0.016* (0.009) 
Political organization 0.018*** (0.004) -0.628* (0.335) 0.000 (0.007) 
Elites -0.006 (0.005) -1.472*** (0.403) 0.083*** (0.009) 
Corruption 0.009* (0.005) -0.790* (0.463) -0.002 (0.011) 
Municipal autonomy 0.003 (0.007) -0.694 (0.451) 0.026* (0.014) 
Note: See Table 2. All the control variables of specification 2, Table 2 are included. We also control for 
openness to foreign trade.
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Table A7: Alternative estimates and robustness checks. Dependent variable: Democracy index, 2000-2004 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
EU aid, cumulative 0.081*        
 (0.044)        
EU aid * FSU trade 0.247***        
 (0.081)        
EU aid, 2000-2004  3.055*** 2.140*      
  (0.843) (1.176)      
EU aid, 2000-2004 * FSU 
trade  2.093 5.656**      
  (1.907) (2.554)      
EU projects    0.032*     
    (0.018)     
EU projects * FSU trade    0.363***     
    (0.077)     
EU projects with NGOs     0.260*    
     (0.134)    
EU projects with NGOs * FSU 
trade     0.834***    
     (0.277)    
EU projects with regional 
government      0.084   
      (0.087)   
EU projects with regional 
government * FSU trade      1.920***   
      (0.446)   
EU projects with federal 
government       -0.023  
       (0.716)  
EU projects with federal 
government * FSU trade       6.062  
       (4.213)  
EU projects with local 
government        0.28 
        (0.184) 
EU projects with local 
government * FSU trade        3.892 
        (4.662) 
FSU trade share -11.169*** -6.612** -13.409*** -11.386*** -7.214** -7.814** -6.318* -5.318 
 (2.839) (2.735) (3.438) (2.666) (3.074) (2.955) (3.252) (3.434) 
Education -43.494 -19.077 -42.62 -57.767* -29.032 -24.503 -17.377 -4.186 
 (33.704) (17.486) (28.374) (30.372) (22.788) (20.954) (25.240) (20.959) 
Income per capita 0.31 -0.193 0.014 0.706 0.3 0.342 -0.205 0.214 
 (0.509) (0.386) (0.485) (0.462) (0.432) (0.441) (0.532) (0.472) 
Share of ethnic Russians 9.981 5.588 1.579 7.858 8.596 9.036* 8.68 8.203 
 (8.050) (4.591) (9.575) (7.917) (5.420) (5.191) (5.675) (5.116) 
Dummy republic 2.065 -0.858 -0.997 0.841 1.471 1.292 1.37 0.677 
 (2.572) (1.987) (3.243) (2.787) (2.640) (2.552) (2.898) (2.412) 
Distance from Moscow -0.3 -0.237 -0.272 -0.275 -0.491** -0.478** -0.312 -0.361* 
 (0.359) (0.210) (0.372) (0.297) (0.205) (0.201) (0.270) (0.213) 
Oil and gas 0.003 0.007*** -0.006 0 0.003 0.003 0.005 0.004 
 (0.003) (0.002) (0.131) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) 
Urbanization 11.097* 12.287* 13.572 11.963* 15.072** 13.094** 17.732** 14.004* 
 (6.396) (6.344) (8.397) (6.455) (6.753) (6.452) (6.904) (7.496) 
Openness to foreign trade 31.404 -30.254 -10.756 41.950* 51.618* 27.604 54.102 -26.624 
 (23.065) (42.906) (53.018) (24.562) (26.702) (32.886) (39.024) (45.982) 
Constant 21.462** 20.752*** 28.521** 23.252** 16.540** 16.899** 14.005* 14.154** 
 (9.632) (5.693) (11.426) (9.457) (6.811) (6.595) (7.524) (6.129) 
Observations 59 79 46 65 79 79 79 79 
R-squared 0.465 0.586 0.559 0.499 0.503 0.524 0.444 0.47 
Regions with zero EU aid 
included No Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Note: see Table 2. 
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Table A8: The effects of various types of EU projects on key dimensions of democracy 
 
 EU projects FSU trade EU projects * FSU trade 
 beta s.e. beta s.e. beta s.e. 
Civil society       
Projects with NGOs 0.049*** (0.015) -0.862* (0.442) 0.059* (0.033) 
Projects with regional government 0.016* (0.009) -1.022** (0.428) 0.234*** (0.060) 
Projects with federal government -0.032 (0.098) -0.896** (0.448) 0.835 (0.560) 
Projects with local government 0.029 (0.027) -0.661 (0.440) 0.252 (0.676) 
Municipal autonomy       
Projects with NGOs -0.005 (0.019) -0.705 (0.453) 0.114*** (0.038) 
Projects with regional government 0.000 (0.015) -0.685 (0.453) 0.164*** (0.056) 
Projects with federal government -0.042 (0.084) -0.682 (0.470) 0.973* (0.501) 
Projects with local government 0.040* (0.023) -0.395 (0.477) 0.303 (0.463) 
Composition of elites       
Projects with NGOs -0.021 (0.017) -1.397*** (0.426) 0.295*** (0.036) 
Projects with regional government -0.023** (0.010) -1.417*** (0.427) 0.414*** (0.059) 
Projects with federal government -0.271*** (0.098) -1.342*** (0.370) 2.347*** (0.565) 
Projects with local government -0.004 (0.027) -0.835 (0.577) 0.658 (0.723) 
Note: See Table 2. All of the Table A7 control variables are included. 
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Table A9: The effects for sub-samples with high and with low coefficient of variation of the share of FSU 
trade in regional GDP. Dependent variable: Democracy index, 2000-2004 
 
Coefficient of 
variation 
Above the mean Below the mean Above the median Below the median 
EU aid, cumulative 0.363*** 0.077 0.252*** 0.003 
 (0.069) (0.057) (0.065) (0.072) 
FSU trade -3.008 -6.498* -6.381 -4.921 
 (6.600) (3.492) (6.138) (4.714) 
EU aid * FSU trade 0.142 0.155 -0.161 0.355** 
 (0.809) (0.102) (0.875) (0.143) 
Note: See Table 2. All the control variables of specification 2, Table 2 are included. 
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Table A10: The effects of lagged explanatory variables. Dependent variable: Democracy index, 2000-2004 
 
 
 (1) 
EU aid, cumulative, 1991-1999 0.078 
 (0.055) 
FSU trade, 1997 -6.587* 
 (3.882) 
EU aid * FSU trade 0.242* 
 (0.134) 
Education -25.384 
 (25.726) 
Income per capita 0.169 
 (0.456) 
Share of ethnic Russians 7.73 
 (5.640) 
Dummy republic 0.9 
 (2.784) 
Distance from Moscow -0.465** 
 (0.211) 
Oil and gas 0.004 
 (0.002) 
Urbanization 15.616** 
 (7.248) 
Constant 17.471** 
 (6.765) 
Observations 78 
R-squared 0.459 
 
Note: See Table 2. Buriatia is excluded. For Pskov, we assume that in the years for which the information on EU 
aid is missing, the region received no EU assistance. 
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Table A11: Effect of FSU trade on EU aid, 1997-2004, panel data 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
FSU trade -0.254 
 
-0.249 
 
-0.277 
 
 
(0.471) 
 
(0.478) 
 
(0.786) 
 Lagged FSU trade 
 
-0.618 
 
-0.609 
 
-0.672 
  
(0.383) 
 
(0.390) 
 
(0.685) 
Constant 0.723*** 0.750*** 0.726*** 0.752*** 0.727*** 0.761*** 
 
(0.121) (0.124) (0.123) (0.126) (0.149) (0.128) 
Observations 632 553 624 546 632 553 
Buriatia excluded   Yes Yes   
Region fixed effects     Yes Yes 
Note: see Table 2. For Pskov, we assume that in the years for which the information on EU aid is missing, the 
region received no EU assistance. 
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Table A12: The effects of computing average income per capita in constant prices. Dependent variable: 
Democracy index, 2000-2004 
 
 
 (2) 
EU aid, cumulative, 1991-2004 0.091** 
 (0.044) 
FSU trade, 2000-2004 -8.095*** 
 (2.964) 
EU aid * FSU trade 0.187** 
 (0.084) 
Education -27.500 
 (23.631) 
Income per capita, constant prices 0.181 
 (0.576) 
Share of ethnic Russians 8.329 
 (5.050) 
Dummy republic 0.921 
 (2.377) 
Distance from Moscow -0.432** 
 (0.211) 
Oil and gas 0.005* 
 (0.002) 
Urbanization, latest Rosstat report 12.923** 
 (6.381) 
Constant 19.193*** 
 (6.415) 
Observations 79 
R-squared 0.505 
 
Note: See Table 2.  
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IV. Data 
 
Key variables 
 
Region Share of FSU trade, % Democracy score 
EU aid, millions of 
EUR 
Adygeia 5.785% 23 0 
Altai (Krai) 67.954% 27 10.3526 
Altai (Republic) 9.622% 27 0.838992 
Amur 1.140% 26 0 
Arkhangelsk 4.631% 37 12.0943 
Astrakhan 23.455% 27 2 
Bashkortostan 14.259% 18 0.147194 
Belgorod 60.136% 25 0.256843 
Briansk 53.538% 28 3.2 
Buriatia 5.437% 30 3.01624 
Cheliabinsk 29.965% 36 6.78807 
Chita 1.419% 26 0 
Chukotka 0.476% 20 0 
Chuvashia 20.317% 33 0.453293 
Dagestan 37.988% 25 0 
Evreyskaia AO 2.698% 23 0 
Ingushetia 1.188% 17 0 
Irkutsk 5.530% 36 4.08083 
Ivanovo 61.544% 27 7.0975 
Kabardino-Balkaria 33.755% 17 0.19 
Kaliningrad 2.342% 35 37.6907 
Kalmykia 16.681% 20 0 
Kaluga 31.534% 31 2 
Kamchatka 0.477% 29 0 
Karachaevo-Cherkessia 51.397% 23 0 
Karelia 1.900% 41 44.7569 
Kemerovo 15.106% 25 28.7196 
Khabarovski 0.474% 25 0.970264 
Khakassia 23.525% 23 0 
Kirov 10.460% 28 0.1278 
Komi 7.218% 36 10.4648 
Kostroma 11.346% 30 0.516018 
Krasnodar 9.551% 27 0.017 
Krasnoiarsk 6.847% 41 6.76223 
Kurgan 63.312% 24 0.0835 
Kursk 59.355% 22 2.32811 
Leningradskaia 2.577% 35 24.3018 
Lipetsk 6.725% 26 0.54587 
Magadan 0.890% 29 0 
Mariy El 13.281% 27 0.721944 
Mordovia 36.491% 20 0 
Moscow (City) 8.941% 31 45.0068 
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Moscow (Oblast) 18.952% 35 10.2401 
Murmansk 1.195% 31 16.5375  
Nizhny Novgorod 25.584% 41 28.3659 
Northern Ossetia 23.778% 19 0 
Novgorod 5.209% 35 6.70277 
Novosibirsk 56.570% 39 72.6859 
Omsk 29.149% 29 6.69884 
Orel 25.429% 24 0.517 
Orenburg 28.429% 30 0.03466 
Penza 29.750% 27 0.276948 
Perm 10.153% 41 12.4919 
Primorski 0.627% 28 0.294035 
Pskov 3.689% 34 8.34998 
Riazan 9.316% 28 0.253 
Rostov 36.802% 26 4.15035 
Sakha 1.059% 28 0 
Sakhalin 0.608% 33 0 
Samara 11.300% 42 0.571597 
Saratov 11.856% 26 8.00256 
Smolensk 7.229% 27 0 
St. Petersburg 6.303% 41 138.219 
Stavropol 15.750% 27 0.2 
Sverdlovskaia 16.442% 45 25.5336 
Tambov 34.452% 28 0 
Tatarstan 15.823% 23 2.51454 
Tiumen 7.062% 34 0.213968 
Tomsk 14.045% 30 3.89972 
Tula 12.297% 28 0.99986 
Tver 27.096% 30 0.695 
Tyva 0.304% 17 0 
Udmurtia 16.441% 30 2.1702 
Ulianovsk 30.724% 25 0.08884 
Vladimir 30.121% 34 4.28 
Volgograd 20.784% 32 0 
Vologda 4.236% 29 6.94876 
Voronezh 35.863% 29 0.7 
Yaroslavl 16.106% 31 6.23935 
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Composition of the Petrov/ Titkov index of regional democracy. (Data and discussion of 
the indices are available from: Sotsial’nyy atlas rossiyskikh regionov: Integral’nye indeksy 
http://atlas.socpol.ru/indexes/index_democr.shtml#methods). 
  
 Regional political organization: balance of powers between the executive and the 
legislative branches, independence of the courts and of law enforcement agencies, 
violations of citizens’ rights. 
 Openness of regional political life: transparency of politics, barriers between regional 
and national politics.  
 Democratic nature of elections at all levels: free and fair elections, electoral 
competition, manipulations and restrictions on active and passive electoral rights. 
 Political pluralism: stable party system, representation of parties in the regional 
parliaments, presence of political coalitions. 
 Independence of mass media. 
 Corruption: link between economic and political elites, corruption scandals. 
 Economic liberalization: regional law and law enforcement, conflicts regarding 
property rights. 
 Civil society: freedom of NGOs, referenda, public protest activity. 
 Elites: composition of elites, mechanisms of rotation of leaders, pluralism of elites. 
 Municipal autonomy: presence of elected municipal government institutions, their 
influence. 
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Trade with Ukraine and with China 
Remarks on data collection 
 We screened all the websites of regional statistical offices, customs offices and regional governments. 
We also browsed through a large number of additional relevant publications.  A study by the Eurasian 
Development bank on cross-border cooperation between Ukraine and Russia was a particularly useful 
source (EDB 2013). 
 We extract the relevant data for the period as close to the timeframe of our investigation as possible. 
Unfortunately, data across different time periods and regions are often inconsistent. Sometimes we had 
to use data from as late as 2012; for some regions, only data for 2014 are available, but we do not use 
them, since trade with Ukraine in this period was already affected by the Crimea and Donbass conflicts.  
 For fourteen regions, we could not find any data. Are these regions significantly different from those 
that do report data on trade? To answer this question, we performed a simple two-way means 
comparison of the key variables for the sub-sample of regions, which reported trade with Ukraine, and 
those which did not. We find no significant difference in terms of FSU trade between these two groups. 
The difference in the means of EU aid is also insignificant (t-tailed test; it is marginally significant at 
the 10 percent level in the one-tailed test, with regions reporting trade with Ukraine receiving more aid). 
Furthermore, regions reporting no trade data for Ukraine are significantly less democratic. Thus, this 
appear to be regions, which receive less EU aid, have similar levels of exposure to FSU trade, and are 
less democratic than regions in the rest of the sample. This combination is in line with our theoretical 
reasoning. We conclude therefore that our results are unlikely to be driven by selection bias.   
 Note that the value of share of trade with Ukraine in regional trade volume for some regions may 
exceed the share of trade with FSU used in the baseline specification. This is because data are extracted 
for different time periods. 
 
Region 
 
Share of trade 
with Ukraine 
Share of trade 
with China 
Period 
 
Source 
 
Adygeia     
Altai (Krai) 8% 22% 2012 Customs 
Altai (Republic) 1% 10% 2012 Customs 
Amur 0% 82% 2005 Regional statistical committee 
Arkhangelsk 4% 23% 2006 Regional government 
Astrakhan     
Bashkortostan     
Belgorod 61% 0% 2000 Regional statistical committee 
Briansk 38%  2007 EDB (2013) 
Buriatia 7% 31% 2012 Customs 
Cheliabinsk 4% 15% 2003, 2004 Statistical office 
Chita 0% 79% 2012 Customs 
Chukotka     
Chuvashia 5% 1% 2000 Regional statistical committee 
Dagestan 3% 20% 2005 Regional statistical committee 
Evreyskaia AO 2% 65% 2000, 2004 Regional statistical committee 
Ingushetia 40% 35% 2011 Customs 
Irkutsk 1% 31% 2012 Customs 
Ivanovo 13% 1% 2005 Regional statistical committee 
Kabardino-Balkaria     
Kaliningrad 2% 8% 2009 Regional statistical committee 
Kalmykia 11% 0% 2000 Regional statistical committee 
Kaluga 7% 1% 2007 Regional statistical committee 
Kamchatka     
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Karachaevo-Cherkessia     
Karelia 2% 2% 2005 Regional statistical committee 
Kemerovo 9% 8% 2005 Regional statistical committee 
Khabarovsk  53% 2006 Interregional Association of 
Eastern and Trans-Baikal 
Regions 
Khakassia 13% 5% 2011 Customs 
Kirov 5% 8% 2004 Regional statistical committee 
Komi 1% 1% 2000 Regional statistical committee 
Kostroma 4% 1% 2000, 2002, 
2003, 2004 
Regional statistical committee 
Krasnodar 6%  2007 Regional government 
Krasnoiarsk 1% 10% 2012 Customs 
Kurgan 2% 4% 2009 Regional statistical committee 
Kursk 48% 2% 2000, 2001, 
2002, 2003, 
2004 
Regional statistical committee 
Leningradskaia 2% 1% 2005 Regional statistical committee 
Lipetsk 3% 0% 2000 Regional statistical committee 
Magadan 1% 2% 2000 Regional statistical committee 
Mariy El 5% 6% 2005 Regional statistical committee 
Mordovia 4% 1% 2005 Regional statistical committee 
Moscow (City) 8%  2000 Libman (2013) 
Moscow (Oblast) 7% 9% 2009 Regional statistical committee 
Murmansk 1% 0% 2000 Regional statistical committee 
Nizhny Novgorod 18% 4% 2007 Regional statistical committee 
Northern Ossetia 6% 0% 2005 Regional statistical committee  
Novgorod 4% 3% 2000 Regional statistical committee 
Novosibirsk 15% 33% 2012 Customs 
Omsk 8% 10% 2012 Customs 
Orel     
Orenburg 4% 2% 2010 Regional government 
Penza 7% 0% 2000 Regional statistical committee 
(only export) 
Perm 2% 11% 2000 Regional statistical committee 
Primorsky  46% 2011 Regional government 
Pskov 1% 16% 2010 Customs 
Riazan 7% 4% 2000 Regional statistical committee 
Rostov 29% 10% 2010 Regional statistical committee 
Sakha      
Sakhalin 0% 10% 2009 Regional statistical committee 
Samara 5% 15% 2003, 2004 Regional statistical committee 
Saratov 8% 4% 2013 Customs 
Smolensk 3% 2% 2005 Regional statistical committee 
St. Petersburg 3% 15% 2005 Regional statistical committee 
Stavropol 6% 2% 2000, 2003, 
2004 
Regional statistical committee 
Sverdlovskaia 2% 4% 2006 Regional statistical committee 
Tambov     
Tatarstan 18% 1% 2005 Regional statistical committee 
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Tiumen     
Tomsk 1% 14% 2012 Regional statistical committee 
Tula     
Tver 10% 16% 2010 Regional statistical committee 
Tyva 6% 81% 2012 Customs 
Udmurtia 35% 1% 2004 (China); 
2011 
(Ukraine) 
Regional statistical committee 
(China); Customs (Ukraine) 
Ulianovsk 21% 1% 2003, 2004 Regional statistical committee 
Vladimir 10% 3% 2005 Regional statistical committee 
Volgograd 14% 1% 2008 Regional statistical committee 
Vologda 5% 2% 2010 Customs 
Voronezh 38% 13% 2000 Regional statistical committee 
Yaroslavl 10% 4% 2009 Regional statistical committee 
Note: Additional sources cited in this table are: EDB (2013) Prigranichnoe Sotrudnichestvo Regionov Rossii, 
Belarussii i Ukrainy. EDB Center for Integration Studies Report No. 17, St. Petersburg; Libman, A. (2013) 
‘Komplementarnost‘ Ekonomiki Rossii i Ukrainy: Regional’nyi Aspekt.’ Vestnik Instituta Ekonomiki Rossiyskoy 
Akademii Nauk, Issue 3. 
 
Summary statistics 
Variable No. Obs. Mean St. dev. Min Max 
Democracy index 79 29.013 6.285 17.000 45.000 
Distance from Moscow 79 2.367 2.748 0.000 11.876 
Dummy autocratic FSU border 79 0.203 0.404 0.000 1.000 
Dummy FSU border 79 0.316 0.468 0.000 1.000 
Dummy Islamic region 79 0.089 0.286 0.000 1.000 
Dummy Northern Caucasus 79 0.076 0.267 0.000 1.000 
Dummy republic 79 0.253 0.438 0.000 1.000 
Education 79 0.172 0.036 0.112 0.360 
EU aid 79 7.904 19.362 0.000 138.220 
EU aid, 1991-1999 79 5.314 15.528 0.000 117.095 
EU projects 65 19.031 38.650 1.000 289.000 
EU projects with federal government 79 0.759 2.132 0.000 15.000 
EU projects with local governments 79 1.519 4.621 0.000 25.000 
EU projects with NGOs 79 1.734 4.963 0.000 39.000 
EU projects with regional government 79 3.089 8.391 0.000 62.000 
Fiscal transfers 79 0.274 0.185 0.011 0.791 
Income per capita 79 3.473 1.948 1.134 14.813 
Oil and gas 79 15.976 114.599 0.000 1019.120 
Openness to foreign trade 79 0.014 0.014 0.001 0.109 
Population 79 1820.562 1619.616 53.600 10313.800 
Share of agricultural products in foreign trade 79 0.120 0.132 0.000 0.703 
Share of China trade 64 0.135 0.200 0.000 0.815 
Share of energy in foreign trade 79 0.191 0.241 0.000 0.960 
Share of ethnic Russians 79 0.769 0.238 0.012 0.966 
Share of FSU trade 79 0.185 0.176 0.003 0.680 
Share of FSU trade, 1997 79 0.209 0.163 0.000 0.795 
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Share of machinery in foreign trade 79 0.222 0.143 0.013 0.716 
Share of metals in foreign trade 79 0.135 0.186 0.001 0.815 
Share of petrochemistry in foreign trade 79 0.128 0.123 0.005 0.603 
Share of Ukraine trade 65 0.097 0.124 0.000 0.614 
Share of wood products in foreign trade 79 0.077 0.126 0.000 0.584 
Territory 79 0.216 0.470 0.000 3.103 
Urbanization 79 0.691 0.129 0.261 1.000 
Note: Shares measured between 0 and 1. For the computation of the share of machinery in foreign trade for 
Adygeia, data for 2003 are not employed, since there appears to be an erroneous entry in the Rosstat data, 
suggesting that trade in machinery far exceeds the overall foreign trade of Adygeia. Oil and gas extraction in 
coal equivalents. 
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V. Average democracy scores of FSU states, Freedom House and Polity IV, 2000-2004 
Country Freedom House (political rights) Polity IV 
Armenia 4.0 5.0 
Azerbaijan 6.2 -7.0 
Belarus 7.0 -7.0 
Georgia 3.8 5.4 
Kazakhstan 6.0 -5.2 
Kyrgyz Republic 6.0 -3.0 
Moldova 2.6 7.8 
Russia 5.2 6.0 
Tajikistan 6.0 -1.8 
Turkmenistan 7.0 -9.0 
Ukraine 4.0 6.0 
Uzbekistan 7.0 -9.0 
Note: The Polity IV scores range from -10 to 10, with 10 assigned to countries with the highest level of 
democracy. The Freedom House scores range from 1 to 7, with 1 being the highest level of democracy. 
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